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Goldey v. Fields

PER CURIAM. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), this Court recognized an implied cause of action for damages against federal officers for certain alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment. The Court subsequently recognized two additional contexts where implied Bivens causes of action were permitted, neither of which was an Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim. After 1980, we have declined more than 10 times to extend Bivens to cover other constitutional violations. Those many post1980 Bivens “cases have made clear that, in all but the most unusual circumstances, prescribing a cause of action is a job for Congress, not the courts.” Egbert v. Boule, 596 U. S. 482, 486 (2022). Despite those precedents, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit permitted the plaintiff here to maintain an Eighth Amendment excessive-force Bivens claim for damages against federal prison officials.

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This Court has repeatedly emphasized that “recognizing a cause of action under Bivens is ‘a disfavored judicial activity.’” Egbert, 596 U. S., at 491. To determine whether a Bivens claim may proceed, the Court has applied a two-step test. First, the Court asks whether the case presents “a new Bivens context”—that is, whether the case “is different in a meaningful way” from the cases in which this Court has recognized a Bivens remedy. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U. S. 120, 139 (2017); see Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980); Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228 (1979); Bivens, 403 U. S. 388. Second, if so, we then ask whether there are “special factors” indicating that “the Judiciary is at least arguably less equipped than Congress to ‘weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.’” Egbert, 596 U. S., at 492. That analysis is anchored in “separation-of-powers principles.” Ziglar, 582 U. S., at 135. This case arises in a new context, and “special factors” counsel against recognizing an implied Bivens cause of action for Eighth Amendment excessive-force violations. To begin with, Congress has actively legislated in the area of prisoner litigation but has not enacted a statutory cause of action for money damages. See Ziglar, 582 U. S., at 148– 149. In addition, extending Bivens to allow an Eighth Amendment claim for excessive force could have negative systemic consequences for prison officials and the “inordinately difficult undertaking” of running a prison. Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 84–85 (1987). Moreover, “an alternative remedial structure” already exists for aggrieved federal prisoners. Ziglar, 582 U. S., at 137; see Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U. S. 61, 74 (2001). The existence of such alternative remedial procedures counsels against allowing Bivens suits even if such “procedures are ‘not as effective as an individual damages remedy.’” Egbert, 596 U. S., at 498. For the past 45 years, this Court has consistently declined to extend Bivens to new contexts. See Egbert, 596 U. S., at 490–491. We do the same here. The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.

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Trump v. CASA, Inc.

Held: Universal injunctions likely exceed the equitable authority that Congress has given to federal courts. The Court grants the Government’s applications for a partial stay of the injunctions entered below, but only to the extent that the injunctions are broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue. Pp. 4– 26.

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Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc.

In 1984, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) created the U. S. Preventive Services Task Force, a body that formulates evidence-based recommendations regarding preventive healthcare services. Congress codified the Task Force’s role in 1999, establishing it as an entity within the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) in HHS’s Public Health Service. The Task Force currently consists of 16 volunteer members appointed by the Secretary of HHS to staggered 4-year terms. Before 2010, Task Force recommendations were purely advisory. The Affordable Care Act of 2010 changed this by requiring most health insurers and group health plans to cover without cost sharing those preventive services that receive “A” or “B” ratings from the Task Force. The Act also amended the governing statute to describe the Task Force as “independent” and to provide that members and their recommendations “shall be independent and, to the extent practicable, not subject to political pressure.” 42 U. S. C. §§299b–4(a)(1), (6). Plaintiffs, individuals and small businesses who object to the Affordable Care Act’s preventive-services coverage requirements, sued in federal court. Lead plaintiff Braidwood Management runs a health and wellness center offering insurance coverage to its approximately 70 employees through a self-insured plan. Plaintiffs argued that Task Force members are principal officers under the Appointments Clause who must be appointed by the President “with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,” Art. II, §2, cl. 2, not by the Secretary. The District Court agreed, recognizing that Task Force members are removable at will by the Secretary but concluding they are principal officers because they “have no superior” who supervises and directs them. 627 F. Supp. 3d 624, 646. While the Government’s appeal was pending, the Secretary in June 2023 ratified existing appointments made by the AHRQ Director and began personally appointing Task Force members. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court, holding that while Task Force members are removable at will, they are not inferior officers because they cannot be “ ‘independent’ ” and “free from ‘political pressure’ ” while simultaneously being supervised by a political appointee.

Held: Task Force members are inferior officers whose appointment by the Secretary of HHS is consistent with the Appointments Clause.

Read by RJ Dieken.