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First Choice has established a present injury to its First Amend ment associational rights sufficient to confer Article III standing.

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In Louisiana v. Callais, the Supreme Court held that Louisiana’s congressional map (SB8), which created an additional majority-Black district, was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander because race predominated in its design without a sufficient justification. The Court clarified that while compliance with §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 can qualify as a compelling interest under strict scrutiny, §2 properly interpreted only requires proof of intentional discrimination—not mere disparate impact—and thus did not require Louisiana to add another majority-minority district. The Court revised the Thornburg v. Gingles framework to align with that interpretation, requiring plaintiffs to show race—not partisanship—drives voting patterns and to produce illustrative maps that satisfy all legitimate state districting goals without relying on race. Applying this updated framework, the Court found the earlier Robinson plaintiffs failed to establish a §2 violation, so Louisiana lacked a compelling interest to use race in drawing SB8, leading the Court to affirm the lower court’s ruling that the map violates the Fourteenth Amendment.

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Because §1446(b)(1)’s text, structure, and context are inconsistent with equitable tolling, Enbridge’s removal was untimely. Pp. 5–14. (a) The fact that the 30-day removal deadline in §1446(b)(1) is non jurisdictional does not automatically render it subject to equitable toll ing. While jurisdictional requirements “cannot be waived or forfeited” and “do not allow for equitable exceptions,” Boechler v. Commissioner, 596 U. S. 199, 203, “[t]he mere fact that a time limit lacks jurisdic tional force . . . does not render it malleable in every respect,” Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, 586 U. S. 188, 192. Some nonjurisdic tional rules remain “mandatory” and “are not susceptible” of equitable tolling. Ibid. The Court need not decide whether §1446(b)(1) qualifies as a statute of limitations subject to a presumption of equitable tolling

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Totality of the Circumstances is required in considering Probable Cause for a temporary stop. Probable Cause being defined as: "Articulable reasonable suspicion for the officers belief that 'criminal activity is afoot.'"

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A U.S. Army specialist injured while stopping a Taliban suicide bomber at a base in Afghanistan sued military contractor Fluor Corporation for negligence after the attacker—an Afghan hired under the military’s “Afghan First” program—was allegedly poorly supervised. Lower courts dismissed the case, holding that state-law claims against contractors are preempted during wartime under the Federal Tort Claims Act’s combatant-activities exception. The Supreme Court rejected that view, ruling that the claims are not preempted because neither the Constitution nor federal statutes bar them, and the FTCA exception does not extend to contractors. Relying on Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. was misplaced, the Court explained, because preemption applies only where a contractor follows specific government directives, not where it allegedly violates them. Since Fluor’s conduct was neither ordered nor authorized by the military—and resolving the case would not second-guess military decisions—there is no significant conflict with federal interests, and traditional state tort law may proceed.

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Chevron has plausibly alleged a close relationship between its challenged crude-oil production and the performance of its federal avgas refining duties—not a tenuous, remote, or peripheral one—and has therefore satisfied the “relating to” requirement of the federal of ficer removal statute.

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The Court held that Colorado’s ban on “conversion therapy,” as applied to a licensed counselor providing only talk therapy, likely violates the First Amendment because it regulates speech based on content and viewpoint. Writing for the majority, Justice Gorsuch concluded that the law does not merely regulate professional conduct but directly restricts what the counselor may say to clients—permitting affirming discussions of a client’s sexual orientation or gender identity while prohibiting speech that seeks to change them. Such viewpoint-based restrictions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional and must satisfy strict scrutiny, not the deferential rational-basis review applied by the lower courts. The Court rejected the idea that “professional speech” receives lesser protection and found that Colorado’s law does not fall within any recognized exception (such as regulating conduct, commercial disclosures, or historically unprotected categories of speech). Because the Tenth Circuit applied the wrong level of scrutiny, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

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The Supreme Court held that the Sentencing Reform Act does not permit courts to automatically extend a defendant’s term of supervised release when the defendant absconds, reversing the Ninth Circuit’s rule that treated time on the run as “tolled.” Isabel Rico’s supervised release had been set to expire in 2021, but after she absconded and later committed a state drug offense in 2022, the Ninth Circuit allowed the district court to treat that offense as a federal supervised‑release violation by deeming her term extended until her arrest in 2023. The Court rejected that approach, explaining that Congress provided specific mechanisms for extending, tolling, or revoking supervised release—and none authorize automatic extension for abscondment, which risks exceeding statutory maximums and contradicts the Act’s detailed structure. The government’s textual, precedential, and common‑law arguments failed to justify such a rule, and policy concerns about gaps in §3583(i)’s warrant requirement must be addressed by Congress, not judicial invention. Justice Gorsuch wrote for the Court; Justice Alito dissented.