Bill Wiseman leads McKinsey’s Global Semiconductor Practice and founded its Taipei Design Lab. He brings a rare mix of semiconductor engineering and national security experience to one question: what happens if Taiwan cannot ship silicon. We unpack why Taiwan risk is bigger than “leading edge logic” including NOR flash, DRAM, advanced packaging, and the electronics manufacturing ecosystem.

Bill explains why this is a 15 year-plus problem, why markets struggle to price it, and why collective action fails without coordination. We then shift to export controls and coalition durability, why ASML and the Netherlands matter, and how corporate incentives differ for commodity components vs ecosystem businesses.

Finally, we get into the messy reality of IP leakage, cyber theft, and why quantum readiness may be the most practical near-term move, plus what the CHIPS Act should be measured on: HBM, packaging, talent, power, and grid margin.

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This and all episodes are enhanced with lots of useful links and transcripts which you can read at https://typhoonbearing.substack.com/p/semiconductors-and-national-security

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Timestamps:

(00:17) Taiwan disruption, global shock

(03:12) Markets, pricing, game theory

(07:05) Taiwan politics, silicon shield

(10:04) Board plans, inventory reality

(17:08) Export controls, coalition durability

(25:38) IP theft, quantum risk

(34:35) CHIPS Act success metrics

(46:01) Security needs beyond leading edge

(55:11) Recommendations and closing

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I love mail. Send comments, critiques, and takes to ⁠⁠typhoonbearing@gmail.com⁠⁠

Traditionally war came with loot. This loot took a lot of forms, ranging from slaves (definitely not allowed today), to enemy military equipment, and whatever you could plunder from the enemies cities and countryside. We still have a few vestiges of these sorts of takings that are "legal" in warfare today. Andrew Clapham argues that we should almost completely ban these sorts of prize-taking, along with blockades and other tools of warfare. I'd actually argue that they are not all bad, and we have a pretty good debate about the topic on this podcast.

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Please support the show if you are able. I greatly appreciate everyone who does so.

Email me at: usnavalhistorypodcast@gmail.com

When the biggest country in the world and the most powerful country in the world can't even talk to each other, how can they possibly avoid war? Well, in the case of the Chinese and British in the early 19th Century... they didn't!

In this episode of the U.S. Naval History Podcast, I interview Professor Henrietta Harrison on the leadup to war that in some ways parallels our world today.

We discuss:

- The difficulty in getting the right information to the country's leaders and the dangers when this does not happen well

- How difficult it is to translate not only languages, but cultures and worldview between Anglo-American English and Chinese

- How just being close enough to do the direct translation in often seen. as inherently suspicious

- The not-so-great fates of the two key interpreters between England and China

- The First Opium War

Subscribe to support the show ($3/month):

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Email me at: ⁠usnavalhistorypodcast@gmail.com⁠