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Wavell Room Audio Reads

Wavell Room Audio Reads

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 An improved audio format version of our written content. Get your defence and security perspectives now through this podcast. Political Science Politics & Government
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  • Mission Partnerships in UK Defence: How to make them work

    Mission Partnerships in UK Defence: How to make them work
    Nov 21 2025
    Introduction: Defence as an engine for growth
    The government's Defence Industrial Strategy 2025 (DIS25) is clear that "business as usual" in procurement is no longer an option. Defence has been placed at the heart of the UK's modern industrial strategy, identified as one of eight priority sectors to drive economic growth and resilience.
    The strategy is frank in its diagnosis of the current system's weaknesses. Defence investment and economic strategy remain misaligned. Procurement processes have failed to adapt to an era where emerging technologies are reshaping warfare faster than at any point in living memory. Structural inefficiencies - from misaligned incentives to poor competition and weak exports - have left the UK industrial base struggling to deliver at the pace and scale required.
    DIS25 calls for something different: procurement that reduces waste, accelerates innovation, empowers SMEs, and crowds in private capital. It seeks to create a vibrant defence technology ecosystem, one where delivery is faster, risk is shared more equitably, and capability can spiral forward through rapid increments. The ambition is to transform the relationship between government and industry, so that defence becomes not just a consumer of technology but a driver of economic productivity.
    This context sets the stage for the idea of "mission partnership." The term is gaining currency across defence, but its meaning remains contested. At its best, it represents a practical shift in how programmes are delivered: a relationship structure where incentives, accountability and behaviours are aligned to outcomes. At its worst, it risks becoming a hollow buzzword, a softer synonym for "contractor" that re-badges old models without changing the fundamentals.
    The question this paper explores is whether mission partnerships can provide the practical vehicle through which the ambitions of DIS25 are realised. It argues that they can, but only if approached seriously: as a means of reshaping delivery behaviours, not simply as a new label for old practices.
    Why the system struggles today
    The weaknesses identified in DIS25 are not new. They are the product of decades of choices and cultural habits that have left the system ill-suited to today's demands.
    Policy pressure for pace, but institutional drag. Ministers have repeatedly signalled the need for faster delivery. The Integrated Procurement Model (IPM) commits Defence to deliver major equipment programmes within five years and digital programmes within three - targets that would have been unthinkable even a decade ago. Yet the approvals and governance cycles underpinning procurement remain rooted in Cold War-era timelines.
    Churn widens the knowledge gap. High turnover across MOD, particularly in technical and engineering roles, erodes institutional memory. Programmes lose continuity, forcing new teams to relearn the same lessons and repeat the same mistakes. This constant rotation undermines trust between customer and supplier, creating a public-private knowledge gap that grows wider with every cycle.

    Outsourcing legacies and switching costs. Two decades of outsourcing have left Defence dependent on a limited set of suppliers. Relationships have become brittle, with high switching costs that make even obvious changes operationally risky. Far from creating a competitive marketplace, outsourcing has often entrenched incumbents, leaving government hostage to long-term contract dependencies.
    Blurry boundaries and accountability. Too many programmes begin with contract mechanics rather than mission outcomes. Assurance is treated as paperwork to be satisfied, not as a shared responsibility for safety and performance. The result is a culture where suppliers do what the contract says, not what the mission requires.
    The combined effect is predictable: while policy demands agility and tempo, the system continues to generate delay.
    A shifting moment in defence innovation
    The environment, however, is shifting. T...
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    16 mins
  • Lessons from the Greco-Turkish War

    Lessons from the Greco-Turkish War
    Nov 19 2025
    The Greco-Turkish War was one of the largest and most consequential conflicts of the interwar period, spanning the period between World War I and World War II. It was a significant factor in the overall trajectory of the modern Middle East. The Hellenic Kingdom looked to expand its territory to connect with the Greeks of Asia Minor.
    In contrast, the nationalist forces under Mustafa Kemal looked to repel the Greek army and simultaneously expel foreign militaries to create a Turkish state. The war intertwined the Entente powers and revealed key lessons in logistics, the importance of a competent officer corps, and the use of key terrain to a defensive advantage, insights that can be studied for modern warfare today.
    Beginnings of the Greco-Turkish
    Against the backdrop of the capitulation of the Ottoman Empire, the remaining territories of the Middle East were placed under zones of influence (Sykes-Picot). In contrast, Asia Minor was put under full military occupation by several nations. The remnants of the Ottoman Empire were carved into a rump state by several nations.
    Turkish nationalist forces would conduct an insurgency led by Mustafa Kemal, a skilled military commander who had defeated British forces at Gallipoli, thereby securing their own state without foreign occupation. The Entente was overstretched, and its citizens felt the economic brunt of WWI, which made it hard for countries such as the UK and France to allocate sufficient forces capable of defeating the factions of Turkish nationalists. Instead, the British would support a key ally in the Mediterranean to defeat the Turkish army - the Hellenic Kingdom of Greece.
    During WWI, the Hellenic Kingdom, overseen by King Constantine I, initially decided to remain neutral despite having a pro-German government. This act caused anger among the Entente and pro-intervention Greek faction (the Venizelists), which resulted in Britain, France, and the latter exiling the then-monarch.
    The new government, led by Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos, adopted a core policy of irredentism regarding the historical Greek lands of Asia Minor, known as the Megali Idea. Furthermore, alongside Armenians, the remaining Greeks under the empire suffered from gruesome massacres amounting to genocide at the hands of the Ottomans in regions such as Eastern Thrace and Pontus, which also became another factor to initiate the war.
    With the military backing of London and Paris, who sought to quell the Kemalist insurgency that posed a threat to their zones of influence in Asia Minor, Athens initiated the Greco-Turkish War on May 15, 1919, during the naval landing in Smyrna.
    Early Hellenic Army Victories
    The Hellenic expeditionary army quickly secured the Greek mandate of Smyrna, then secured the outlying cities of Aydin, Menemen, Bergama, Ayvalik, and Cesme. After consolidating tens of thousands of troops, the British and Hellenic army would move to secure cities near the Sea of Marmara during the 1920 summer offensive.
    The Greek army captured the cities of Panormos, Izmit, Mudanya, Bursa, and Usak, securing much of Western Anatolia for both Athens and London. A Turkish counterattack at Gediz proved inconclusive before the winter set in.
    In Greece, King Alexander died from a monkey infection, and citizens felt from WWI and now feeling exhausted from an inconclusive campaign at the time in Asia Minor. A pro-royalist faction would win the upcoming elections, which would oust Venizelos as PM, who was replaced by Dimitrios Gounaris. The November 1920 elections would play a consequential turning point in the war going forward in 1921 and 1922.
    Athens Overstretched Its Logistics and Allied Support Wears Thin
    Instead of continuing to secure the coastlines where the Hellenic and British navies could provide maritime and logistical support, the Greek army pushed into Central Anatolia to defeat the Turkish nationalist forces for good. Later in the war, several Turkish factions organized into a more cohesive...
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    12 mins
  • "After me, the flood"

    "After me, the flood"
    Nov 14 2025
    Much has been written elsewhere regarding the unforgivable sin of failing to plan for known contingencies. Whatever one thinks of the current changes undergoing the United States Army, the least controversial thing to be said about them is that they certainly represent a change from what has come before. And regardless of what one thinks, or refuses to think, about their merit, one can say one other thing for certain: they will eventually yield. Sooner or later, the "idiosyncrasies" of the current administration will again be replaced by "regular order". They must, the only question is how long will that transformation take. As members of the profession of arms we must at least consider how we will collectively re-establish some of the fundamental characteristics and capabilities of our military in the period that follows.
    This is essential, because any period of chaos or lack of resolve on our part has the potential to imperil national defense. Without a plan, what could be a very bumpy transition could give rise to an exploitable opportunity on the part of America's enemies to damage American interests, threaten America's overseas holdings, gain footholds in the "near-abroad", or threaten mainland America itself. The US Army's unshakable contract with the American people to fight and win the nation's wars by providing prompt, sustained land dominance across the full spectrum for conflict does not leave a lot of time for navel gazing during periods of uncertainty or of transition. In so far as that political uncertainty may unavoidably involve our Army, it is our responsibility to plan our way to the other side of it so that we may safeguard essential capabilities and be in a position to continue mission.
    Retaking the moral high ground (rule of law)
    The current administration's problematic relationship with the principles that inform the just use of force, such as the rule of law and the laws of land warfare, have been comprehensively documented elsewhere. Recent examples, in the form of exploding Venezuelan fishing boats accompanied by official pronouncements of indifference to the legal niceties of such action, make the direction we are moving in all too clear. What concerns us here is how best to put Humpty Dumpty back again after he has been comprehensively damaged.
    Respect for the law that underpins the just use of force, and especially the various international regimes that support it, is difficult to build and easy to dismantle. This is especially the case where the offending party has heretofore held a pre-eminent role in maintaining the status quo. As America abandons her post as the guardian of international law and of the rules-based international order to seek a role as one among several regional hegemons this will, by design, create a destabilizing environment for smaller nations and could lead to the readjustment of borders through conflict.
    Thinking through to a future where America may once again seek to champion a rules-based international order, how might we, as nation and as an Army, seek to incentivize participation by smaller nations who we may have earlier abandoned to their fate? I would suggest, ironically, that by maintaining our military strength and capabilities we may again be able to benignly bully the world in a multilateral rules-based order that transcends "the law of the jungle" as we did in the post WWII period. More than that, we would have to identify and maintain reservoirs of good practice and learning that survive the current period - such as the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court, independent centers for the study of international law (in so far as our institutional ones do not avoid becoming fatally compromised), and independent expertise to whom we might have resort when we need them to rebuild our own institutional capacity.
    Rebuilding academic infrastructure
    Similarly, the loss of academic independence and the curtailing of academic enquiry, although easy to achiev...
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    8 mins
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