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The Supreme Court: Oral Arguments

The Supreme Court: Oral Arguments

By: Brad Neal
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  • Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish
    Jan 12 2026
    Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish | 01/12/26 | Docket #: 24-813 24-813 CHEVRON USA INC. V. PLAQUEMINES PARISH DECISION BELOW: 103 F.4th 324 January 8 , 2026 JUSTICE ALITO WILL NOT CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS CASE. CERT. GRANTED 6/16/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: This petition arises from Louisiana parishes' efforts to hold petitioners liable in state court for, inter alia , production of crude oil in the Louisiana coastal zone during World War II. Petitioners removed these cases from state court under 28 U.S.C. §1442 (a)(1), which as amended in 2011 provides federal jurisdiction over civil actions against "any person acting under [an] officer" of the United States "for or relating to any act under color of such office." The Fifth Circuit unanimously held that petitioners satisfy the statute's "acting under" requirement by virtue of their WWII-era contracts to supply the federal government with high-octane aviation gasoline ("avgas"). But the panel divided on the "relating to" requirement, with the two-judge majority holding that petitioners' wartime production of crude oil was "unrelated" to their contractually required refinement of that same crude into avgas because the contracts did not contain any explicit "directive pertaining to [petitioners'] oil production activities." App.38. Judge Oldham dissented, explaining that the majority's approach reinstates a variant of the "causal nexus" requirement that multiple circuits (and the U.S. Congress) have expressly rejected. The Fifth Circuit denied rehearing en banc by a vote of 7 to 6. The questions presented are: 1. Whether a causal-nexus or contractual-direction test survives the 2011 amendment to the federal-officer removal statute. 2. Whether a federal contractor can remove to federal court when sued for oil-production activities undertaken to fulfill a federal oil-refinement contract. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-30294, 23-30422
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  • FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund
    Dec 10 2025
    FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund | 12/10/25 | Docket #: 24-345 24-345 FS CREDIT CORP. V. SABA CAPITAL MASTER FUND, LTD. DECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 3174971 CERT. GRANTED 6/30/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: The courts of appeals have split 2-1 over whether Congress created an implied private right of action in Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act (ICA), which provides: (1) A contract that is made, or whose performance involves, a violation of this subchapter ... is unenforceable by either party .... (2) To the extent that a contract described in paragraph (1) has been performed, a court may not deny rescission at the instance of any party unless such court finds that under the circumstances the denial of rescission would produce a more equitable result than its grant and would not be inconsistent with the purposes of this subchapter. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46(b)(1)-(2). The Third and Ninth Circuits, relying on statutory text and structure, hold that Section 47(b) does not create an implied private right of action, and a panel of the Fourth Circuit has agreed in an unpublished opinion. Only the Second Circuit-where plaintiffs may be able to sue most investment funds subject to the ICA, given New York's and the New York Stock Exchange's roles in financial operations- holds the opposite based on an "inference": parties may bring a lawsuit under Section 47(b), even though Congress never said so. The question presented is whether Section 47(b) of the ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46 (b), creates an implied private right of action. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-8104, 24-79, 24-80, 24-82, 24-83, 24-116, 24-189
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  • Hamm v. Smith
    Dec 10 2025
    Hamm v. Smith | 12/10/25 | Docket #: 24-872 24-872 HAMM, COMMISSIONER AL DOC V. SMITH DECISION BELOW: 2024 WL 4793028 THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER AND HOW COURTS MAY CONSIDER THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF MULTIPLE IQ SCORES IN ASSESSING AN ATKINS CLAIM. CERT. GRANTED 6/6/2025 QUESTION PRESENTED: Like most States, Alabama requires that offenders prove an IQ of 70 or less to satisfy the intellectual-functioning prong of Atkins v. Virginia . This case was not close: Smith scored 75, 74, 72, 78, and 74 on five full-scale IQ tests. There is no way to conclude from these five numbers that Smith's true IQ is likely to be 70 or below. So the courts below required Smith to prove only that his IQ " could be " 70 and required the State to bring evidence "strong enough" to "foreclose" and "rule out the possibility" of intellectual disability. The first question presented is: 1. Whether, under a proper application of Atkins , a State can require a claimant to prove an IQ of 70 or less by a preponderance of the evidence. Evaluating multiple IQ scores is "complicated," and "this Court has not specified how" to do it. In the State's view, five scores are more accurate than one, and there are ways to account for that fact. The courts below disagree. The district court relied on Smith's 72 ± 3 to find that his IQ "could be" 69. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit's "holistic approach" asked whether Smith had scores of "about" 75 or less. Counting four out of five scores between 72 and 75, the court found "consistent evidence" that Smith "may" qualify as mildly disabled. Thus, the court "followed the law's requirement," in its view, to "move on" to Smith's adaptive deficits. The second question presented is: 2. Whether courts evaluating multiple IQ scores must find that every valid score of "about" 75 or less supports an Atkins claim. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-14519
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