The third episode of the five-part podcast series on the book, "Public Choice – A Primer" by Dr Eamonn Butler, explores how incentives drive political and bureaucratic behaviour, why collective decisions are vulnerable to special interest influence, and how institutional design, as explained by Public Choice Theory, can either mitigate or amplify these distortions.

Drawing from Chapters 5 to 9 of the book, this episode explores how collective decision-making processes are frequently shaped by interest groups, political bargaining, and bureaucratic incentives. It highlights the subtle yet influential ways in which concentrated interests and institutional mechanisms shape policy outcomes—often at the expense of broader public welfare.This podcast series aims to make the ideas of public choice theory more accessible to a wider audience. Speaker:

Kumar Anand, Economist & Public Policy Professional; Senior Fellow, Academy, Centre for Civil Society (CCS), New Delhi

Moderator:

Sreelakshmi Harilal, Associate, Research & Projects, Centre for Public Policy Research (CPPR), Kochi, Kerala

Tune in for an insightful conversation on Public Choice Theory and its application in understanding power, interest groups, incentives, as well as institutional, political, and public policy decision-making in democratic systems.