Zelensky sacks a defence minister, then removes his commander-in-chief, and suddenly the question is not “who is better?” but “who controls the politics of war?”

I use this as an opportunity to explore the systemic warfighting capacities of Ukraine and Russia defined not so much in military but political terms: political focus, generating and motivating soldiers, and learning. Russia can concentrate resources and recruit with money longer than many expect, but morale, discipline, and selective adaptation bite hard when reforms threaten the regime’s control. Ukraine looks more politically contested, yet its civic autonomy and bottom-up innovation can translate into faster learning and stronger buy-in. Which matters more in the end, mass or legitimacy?

The books I discuss are:

Serhiy Kudelia, Seize the City, Undo the State: The Inception of Russia's War on Ukraine (Oxford UP, 2025)

Edward Crowther, War in Ukraine, Vol. 1: Armed Formations of the Donetsk People’s Rep 2014-2022 (Helion, 2022)

Illya Sekirin, Rise of the Machines – Drone Warfare in the Russia-Ukraine War, edited by Andrew Simms (Helion, 2026)

The articles I mention are:

Balász Jarábik, 'Control Above Reform: What’s Behind Ukraine’s Government and Security Reshuffle?,' Carnegie Politika, 24 July 2026

Fabrizio Minniti & Giangiuseppe Pili, ‘Russia’s Selective Adaptation: Command, Control and the Limits of Learning in War,' RUSI, 22 July 2026

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