The stakes for George Gordon Meade could not have been higher. After his stunning victory at Gettysburg in July of 1863, the Union commander spent the following months trying to bring the Army of Northern Virginia to battle once more and finish the job. The Great Battle Never Fought: The Mine Run Campaign, November 26-December 2 1863 recounts the final chapter of the forgotten fall of 1863 - when George Gordon Meade made one final attempt to save the Union and, in doing so, save himself. 

July 1, 1863, had gone poorly for the Union army’s XI Corps. Shattered in battle north of the Pennsylvania town of Gettysburg, the battered and embarrassed unit ended the day hunkered at the crest of a cemetery-topped hill south of the village. Reinforcements fortified the position, which extended eastward to include another key piece of high ground, Culp’s Hill. The Federal line also extended southward down Cemetery Ridge, forming what eventually became a long fishhook.

Although many books on Gettysburg have addressed the role played by Brig. Gen. John Buford and his First Cavalry Division troops, there is not a single book-length study devoted entirely to the critical delaying actions waged by Buford and his dismounted troopers and his horse artillerists on the morning of July 1, 1863. Award-winning Civil War historian Eric J. Wittenberg rectifies this glaring oversight with The Devil’s to Pay.

Throughout the devastating years of the Civil War, the Union Army of the Potomac seldom marched in step. In this provocative book, acclaimed historian and award-winning author Stephen W. Sears takes a fascinating look at some of the intriguing Union generals and the controversies that swirled around them. Delving into historical documents and the personal papers of military officers, Sears shares the compelling stories of oft-maligned Generals McClellan and Hooker, the shocking court-martial of patriotic General Stone, the failed plots to kidnap Confederate President Jefferson Davis, and more.

The Gettysburg Campaign did not end at the banks of the Potomac on July 14, but two weeks later, deep in central Virginia along the line of the Rappahannock. Once Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia slipped across the swollen Potomac back to Virginia, the Lincoln administration pressed George Meade to cross quickly in pursuit - and he did. Rather than follow in Lee’s wake, however, Meade moved south on the east side of the Blue Ridge Mountains in a cat-and-mouse game to outthink his enemy and capture the strategic gaps penetrating the high, wooded terrain.